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Estimates of 21st Century global-mean surface temperature in-
crease have generally been based on scenarios that do not include
climate policies. Newly developed multigas mitigation scenarios,
based on a wide range of modeling approaches and socioeconomic
assumptions, now allow the assessment of possible impacts of
climate policies on projected warming ranges. This article assesses
the atmospheric CO2 concentrations, radiative forcing, and tem-
perature increase for these new scenarios using two reduced-
complexity climate models. These scenarios result in temperature
increase of 0.5–4.4°C over 1990 levels or 0.3–3.4°C less than the
no-policy cases. The range results from differences in the assumed
stringency of climate policy and uncertainty in our understanding
of the climate system. Notably, an average minimum warming of
1.4°C (with a full range of 0.5–2.8°C) remains for even the most
stringent stabilization scenarios analyzed here. This value is sub-
stantially above previously estimated committed warming based
on climate system inertia alone. The results show that, although
ambitious mitigation efforts can significantly reduce global warm-
ing, adaptation measures will be needed in addition to mitigation
to reduce the impact of the residual warming.
climate  climate policy  stabilization  integrated assessment  scenario
A key indicator for climate change is the expected global-mean surface temperature increase. Future global temper-
ature changes will be determined primarily by future emissions
of greenhouse gases, ozone, and aerosol precursors and the
response of the Earth system to those emissions. Any calculation
of the potential range of future climate change requires consid-
eration of both a plausible range of emissions scenarios and
uncertainties in Earth system response, preferably by using
results from multiple scenarios and models. The present analysis
aims to map out the potential benefits of climate mitigation
actions in terms of how much temperature increase can be
avoided as a function of abatement effort. By including scenarios
that are among the most stringent in the current literature, the
analysis also provides quantitative insight into how much warm-
ing is likely to remain as a result of inertia within the energy
system as well as the climate system. Such information is of
critical importance in the climate policies that are currently being
formulated.
The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (1) recently projected
that by 2100, global mean surface temperature would increase by
1.1–6.4°C over the 1990 level using the range of illustrative
baseline (nonmitigation) emissions scenarios from six energy-
economic modeling teams that had been developed in the IPCC
Special Report on Emissions scenarios (SRES) (2) (the low end
of the range results from the so-called B1 scenario; the upper
range from the A1FI scenario). This uncertainty range originates
both from the range in emissions scenarios and from the limited
understanding of the climate system. Earlier, broadly consistent
results for the same scenarios were reported in IPCC’s Third
Assessment Report (TAR) (3) (1.4–5.8°C), in individual model
studies (4), in probabilistic approaches (5, 6), and in multimodel
intercomparison studies (7, 8). Others obtained similar estimates
of baseline temperature ranges with independently developed
nonmitigation scenarios (9). The SRES emissions scenarios,
however, do not include explicit policies to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions, which would lower the extent of climate change
experienced over the 21st Century. Some work (which is also
reported in AR4) has been done on the so-called ‘‘climate
change commitment,’’ i.e., the warming that would occur if
concentrations were kept at the year 2000 levels, with an
estimated average value of 0.6°C over the course of the 21st
Century (10, 11). However, this climate change commitment is
only a hypothetical number because inertia in human systems
will result in increasing concentrations in the near future,
whereas, in the more distant future, both emissions and con-
centrations can fall. Scenarios based on credible and feasible
mitigation strategies are arguably more relevant for policy
making (12). Although there have been analyses based on
multigas emissions pathways (e.g., refs. 13 and 14) andmitigation
scenarios (15–21), a comprehensive assessment of climate im-
pacts using a range of multigas mitigation scenarios from dif-
ferent models has not yet been made.
Progress in developing multigas mitigation scenarios now
allows a comparison between climate consequences of such
mitigation scenarios versus baseline scenarios. This comparison
considers the major uncertainties: climate sensitivity, carbon
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cycle processes, socioeconomic modeling approach, climate
modeling approach, different baseline assumptions, and climate
policy uncertainty (different stabilization levels).
For this article, a set of baseline and associated mitigation
scenarios was compiled from a group of Integrated Assessment
Models (IAM) with results for the most relevant greenhouse
gases and air pollutants (although these model also calculate
greenhouse gas concentration and climate change, here, we use
only their emission outputs). These models are AIM, EPPA,
IMAGE, IPAC, MESSAGE and MiniCAM (22–30). The IAMs
include all major greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, and
halocarbons) and consistent representations of air pollutants,
i.e., aerosols (SO2) and tropospheric ozone precursors (CO,
NOx, VOCs). The mitigation scenarios focus on stabilizing
radiative forcing (as a useful integrating metric across agents).
Most of the scenarios were developed for the EMF-21 model
comparison (31, 32). Together, they represent a wide range of
different approaches in modeling the socioeconomic system and
capture major uncertainties associated with future emissions.
Here, the radiative forcing and climate implications of the
emissions projections were simulated by using two climate
models [see supporting information (SI) Text]: a relatively simple
climate model (MAGICC) (5) and an earth system model of
intermediate complexity (Bern2.5CC) (33, 34). Both models
simulate atmospheric gas cycles including the effect of air
pollutant gases, radiative forcing, and temperature change. In
both cases, global emissions were used as model input. MAGICC
couples global carbon and gas cycle models with a one-
dimensional upwelling diffusion model of ocean heat transport,
here tuned to emulate global mean climate responses of 19
coupled atmospheric–ocean models. The Bern2.5CC model
combines a zonally averaged dynamic ocean model with models
for the atmosphere, thermodynamic sea ice, marine carbon cycle,
and dynamic vegetation. Both models have been used extensively
in IPCC reports, and the combination is used here to get some
representation of model differences as they contribute to un-
certainty. For that reason, they are used here in their standard
IPCC model setup (see SI Text). Results are presented as ranges
with climate sensitivity and carbon-cycle parameters varied over
plausible ranges. Throughout this article, temperature increase
is reported in comparison with 1990 levels, defined as the
average over 1980–2000 (see SI Text for additional metrics
and/or other reference periods sometimes used in the literature).
Emissions Scenarios
In the baseline (no climate policy) scenarios, the range of
increase in greenhouse gas emissions by 2100 is from 70% to
almost 250% compared with 2000 in the absence of climate
policy [Fig. 1; emissions are reported in equivalents by using
global warming potentials (35) for reporting purposes only]. In
all baseline scenarios, emissions growth slows down in the second
half of the century because of a combination of stabilizing global
population levels and continued technological change. The
scenario range used here is reasonably representative of values
in the current literature (31) and broadly consistent with the
SRES-range. The current set of baseline scenarios lacks cases
with substantial declines in emissions over the last part of the
21st Century, which increases the lower end of temperature
range for baseline scenarios somewhat compared with AR4, as
indicated further below.
The mitigation scenarios necessarily follow a very different
pattern, with a peak in global emissions between 2020 and 2040
at a maximum value of 50% above current emissions levels. The
mitigation scenarios can be classified into categories according
to their radiative forcing target. A large group of the scenarios
(8 of 15) aim for stabilization (ca. 2150) at 4.5 W/m2 compared
with preindustrial, which was the target of the EMF-21 exercise
(hereafter referred to as ‘‘4.5 W/m2’’ target). Note that the
results presented here do not necessarily stabilize at 4.5 W/m2
when simulated through the climate models used here because
Fig. 1. Emissions of equivalent CO2 under the baseline scenarios (A) and mitigation scenarios (B), comparison of cumulative CO2 emissions (C), and the net
present value (NPV) of abatement costs (D). Emissions inA andB are expressed in CO2-equivalent emissions for illustrative purposes. The numbers used to identify
the scenarios refer to actual forcing target used within the models. D shows the approximate NPV of abatement costs (see SI Text) as a function of year-2100
radiative forcing as calculated by MAGICC. The colors indicate the different grouping (black, baseline; light blue, 4.5 W/m2 stabilization scenarios from EMF-21;
dark blue, scenarios with higher stabilization targets than EMF-21; pink, scenarios with targets in between 3.5 and 4 W/m2; and purple, scenarios with targets
3.5 W/m2).
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they may represent the carbon cycle and the fate of gases
somewhat differently than did the original modeler. This group
of scenarios shows cumulative CO2 emissions of 850-to 1,000
Gigaton Carbon (GtC) (Fig. 1C), on average reduced by 40%
compared with the baseline. One mitigation scenario has higher
(1,100 GtC) and several have considerably lower cumulative
emissions (400–850 GtC). The lowest scenarios (IMAGE29,
IMAGE26, MESSAGE32—purple in Figs. 1 and 2C) have
forcing targets 3.5 W/m2 (hereafter referred to as ‘‘lowest
scenarios’’).
The mitigation scenarios are developed in each of the inte-
grated assessment model by selecting a cost-effective set of
emission reduction measures. In general, most reductions are
obtained by reducing energy-related CO2 emissions (70–90% of
reductions across the scenarios), followed by non-CO2 gases
(15–30%) and CO2 from land-use (relatively small contribution;
both positive and negative as side effects of other reductions
measures). Energy-related CO2 emissions are generally reduced
by increases in energy efficiency and application of low/zero
carbon energy technologies. In terms of timing, models aim to
avoid drastic emission reductions that require (costly) premature
reduction of capital; in other words, emission reductions are
bounded by the inertia of capital replacement in the energy
system. The emission reductions in 2050 vary considerably as a
function of the stabilization target. For the 4.5 W/m2 target,
year-2050 emissions are 2–30% lower than the year-2000 emis-
sions, but for the category of lowest scenarios, emissions are
20–60% lower than in year 2000. The category of lowest
scenarios tend to push the limits in terms of rate and direction
of technological and lifestyle changes. For example, they include
the use of bioenergy in combination with carbon-capture and
storage, which provides the possibility of net negative emissions
from electricity production (36). These scenarios are among the
lowest emissions scenarios currently found in the literature (17).
Air pollutant emissions are always lower in the mitigation
scenarios than in the baseline scenarios (e.g., 19–88 Teragram
Sulphur (Tg S)/yr for the baseline scenarios versus 4–54 Tg S/yr
for the mitigation scenarios in 2100). CO2 emissions reduction
and SO2 emissions reduction are tightly coupled (r2  0.64;
slope 1.08); a correlation is also found for NOx, VOCs and CO
(SI Text). These correlations result from the changes induced by
climate policies in the energy system and are important because
these gases also influence radiative forcing via aerosol and ozone
formation. In the short term, the coupling between SO2 and CO2
emission reduction is crucial because part of the reduced warm-
ing resulting from lower CO2 emissions is offset by additional
warming due to reduced SO2 emissions (37).
The change in abatement cost as a function of the policy
target, here represented by radiative forcing in 2100, is shown in
Fig. 1D (see SI Text). As a generic costs measure, the net present
value (NPV) of abatement costs is used. The general result is a
strong correlation between more ambitious targets and increas-
ing costs. The costs for any particular target varies substantially
depending on assumptions for technological options considered,
Fig. 2. Radiative forcing and temperature change in year 2100 (A and B), transient temperature change (C) and 2100 temperature increase as a function of
cumulative emissions (D). Radiative forcing relative to a preindustrial state and temperature change relative to 1980–2000 are given for baseline (red) and
mitigation (blue) scenarios (A and B). Central values are shown as symbols and uncertainty ranges as color bands. Uncertainty ranges in MAGICC originate from
the 19 MAGICC runs emulating different AOGCMS (mean 1  across 19 MAGICC runs) with darker area showing the impact of climate sensitivity only (CS; CS
range is 2.0–4.9°C), and the lighter shaded uncertainty ranges show the combined effect of climate sensitivity (CS) plus carbon cycle response (CC) uncertainties
(i.e., CS CC). The full Bern2.5CC model ranges (CS CC) were obtained by combining different assumptions about the behavior of the CO2 fertilization effect,
the response of heterotrophic respiration to temperature, and the turnover time of the ocean, thus approaching an upper boundary of uncertainties in the
carbon cycle (CC), and additionally accounting for the effect of varying climate sensitivity (CS) from 1.5 to 4.5°C. C includes the increase of global mean
temperature over time for MAGICC (using the same color codes and symbols as Fig. 1). D shows the temperature increase (mean and CS  CC range) for both
climate models as a function of cumulative CO2 emissions from 2000 to 2100.
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the rate of technological change, substitution between produc-
tion factors (e.g., capital and energy), recycling of tax revenues,
and baseline emissions (38). For the 4.5 W/m2 target, the net
present value of abatement costs from 2000 to 2100 range from
2 to 19 trillion 2000-US$ across the models. The highest cost
levels (for the most stringent targets) are equivalent to about
2–3% of NPV of GDP (see also Discussion and Conclusions).
Outcomes of the Climate Models
Radiative forcing (Fig. 2A) shows the integrated effect of the
complete suite of greenhouse gases, aerosols, and precursors and
stratospheric and tropospheric ozone. Baseline case forcing in
2100 for central parameters ranges from 6 to 10 W/m2 compared
with preindustrial over the range of emissions scenarios. Forcing
in mitigation cases is stabilized or declining by 2100, with values
reduced to 2.4–5.1 W/m2. Both the MAGICC and Bern2.5CC
models show similar results for central climate and carbon cycle
parameters. The uncertainty ranges, however, are not directly
comparable. For Bern2.5CC, the range results from plausible
assumptions on upper and lower limits for carbon sequestration
by land and ocean (34). For MAGICC, the range is the 1
standard deviation range across a set of 19 MAGICC runs (see
SI Text).
The carbon dioxide concentrations for the baseline cases
range from 650–950 ppm in 2100 by using central model
parameters (for both climate models). Carbon dioxide concen-
trations in the mitigation scenarios range from 380 to 620 ppm
in 2100. The subset of 4.5 W/m2-target scenarios yields a CO2
concentration range of 500–590 ppm for central carbon-cycle/
climate parameters.
Projected temperature changes by year 2100 (relative to 1990)
are 2.6–4.6°C (Fig. 2B) for the baseline scenarios and central
(best-estimate) model parameters. Uncertainties in the carbon
cycle and climate sensitivity more than double the ranges
associated with emissions to 2.1–6.1°C in MAGICC and results
in an even wider range of possible outcomes in the Bern2.5CC
model of 1.4–7.7°C. The range of MAGICC outcomes is on the
low end of the range somewhat higher than the numbers
reported in TAR and AR4 (1.1°C) as a result of the fact that here
no scenarios have been considered that significantly reduce
emissions without climate policy (1, 3). Apart from this, the
numbers are broadly consistent.
For the mitigation scenarios, the projected temperature
changes by 2100 are 1.1–2.4°C by using central model parame-
ters. The mitigation scenarios bring down the overall range of
temperature change substantially relative to the baseline range
with the largest impact on the high end of the range, which is
lowered by 3°C. The greatest difference compared with the
baseline is seen during the second part of the century, when the
rate of temperature change slows considerably in all mitigation
scenarios in contrast to the baseline scenarios. By the end of
century, the rate of temperature change under the mitigation
scenarios is considerably below the rate of the baseline scenarios
(which still show strongly increasing temperature). In fact, under
default assumptions in climate parameters in several mitigation
scenarios, surface air temperature has more or less stabilized by
year 2100. In other words, the policy scenarios have even a
greater impact on the additional warming beyond 2100 than the
differences reported for that particular year. For the 4.5 W/m2
target, climate model simulations result in a 2100 temperature
increase of 0.8–4.4°C (full Bern2.5CC range).
The temperature increase is 1.1–1.7°C for the central model
parameter settings for the lowest emissions scenarios, with a full
range of 0.5–2.8°C in the Bern2.5CC model (Fig. 2). Thus, even
under these low scenarios, global mean temperature increase
could exceed 2°C compared with 1990 depending on climate or
carbon-cycle parameters. Assuming that these scenarios repre-
sent a lower bound on feasible emissions reductions, these results
represent an estimate of the ‘‘minimum warming’’ that considers
inertia of both the climate system and socioeconomic systems.
The average warming of these scenarios is 1.4°C, of which0.6°C
is due to the climate system inertia alone (6). The socioeconomic
and technological inertias thus account for 0.8°C additional
warming by 2100 relative to 1990.
The temperature change in the different scenarios is closely
related to the 1990–2100 cumulative carbon emissions (indus-
trial and land-use change), with deviations varying according to
other emissions (air pollutants, non-CO2 greenhouse gases) and
emissions pathway. The correlation between cumulative indus-
trial CO2 emissions and temperature change in 2100 yields a
standard deviation of 0.2°C (SI Text). Deviations from a perfect
correlation are due mainly to the effects of non-CO2 greenhouse
gases.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have examined a large set of projections for 21st Century
emissions of a suite of greenhouse and other air pollutant gases.
The emissions scenarios provide an indication of the potential
effects of mitigation policies. In interpreting these results, how-
ever, it should be noted that most of the emissions models used
are idealized in many ways. New technologies and policies are
assumed to be globally applicable and are often introduced over
relatively short periods of time. Especially in the lowest scenar-
ios, it is assumed that some form of global climate policy can be
implemented shortly after 2010, as a result of which global
emissions can peak ca. 2020. On the other hand, some future
mitigation options might not have been considered to the full
extent. The scenarios here do not generally deal with the
question of political feasibility and assume, for example, that
mitigation policies are implemented globally and in all sectors of
the economy.
Consider first the 4.5 W/m2 scenarios, which represent a
stabilization target of the magnitude often considered by energy-
economic analyses. Global emissions in these scenarios begin to
diverge from baseline values ca. 2020–2030, with emissions
dropping to approximately present levels by 2100. Achieving any
of these emissions pathways is likely to be challenging compared
with past and present mitigation efforts, although views on the
magnitude of this challenge differ widely. Temperature starts to
diverge from the baseline projections later than emissions. This
delay emphasizes the importance of early decisions to meet
specific mitigation targets. By the end of the century, the climate
consequences of the 4.5 W/m2 target scenarios result in temper-
ature changes of 0.8–4.4°C relative to 1990 average instead of a
warming of 1.4–7.7°C for the baseline projections. Central model
parameter settings in 2100 result in 2.1°C for the 4.5 W/m2
target instead of 2.4–4.6°C for the baseline projections. It should
be noted that the mitigation scenarios also have a lower warming
commitment beyond 2100 than the baseline scenarios.
The lowest scenarios result in a warming of 0.5–2.8°C
(average 1.4°C). These scenarios provide a guide to the range
of global-mean warming that may occur, assuming ambitious
climate policy. The value could be interpreted as a more
realistic minimum warming based on technological and eco-
nomic inertia (although given the nature of uncertainty in
emission modeling, the lower bound given here is not a formal
one; it simply ref lects the assumptions of what is possible based
on model assumptions). Its value is substantially above previ-
ously estimated committed warming due to climate system
inertia only [0.2–1.0°C; (10, 11)]. It should be noted that these
scenarios depart from the corresponding no-climate-policy
baseline by 2015–2020. Furthermore, they incorporate the
widespread development and deployment of existing carbon-
neutral technologies in coming decades and, subsequently, of
new carbon-neutral technologies. Although the integrated
assessment/energy economics model runs indicate that these
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scenarios may be technically feasible, they clearly require
sociopolitical and technical conditions very different from
those now existing.
Under the lowest scenarios analyzed here, therefore, meeting
a target of 2°C temperature change relative to preindustrial
conditions (i.e., 1.5°C relative to 1980–2000) is possible, but is
not at all guaranteed. Obviously, the chances of meeting the
target decrease substantially for less-stringent stabilization tar-
gets. Given the large uncertainty ranges resulting from our
limited understanding/knowledge of climate sensitivity and car-
bon cycle processes, the results reconfirm the need to formulate
targets in probabilistic terms (5, 39, 40). Our results show that
even the lowest scenarios available in literature, based on
optimistic assumptions with respect to international cooperation
in climate policy, lead to considerable increases in global mean
temperature. These results show that adaptation measures will
be needed in addition to mitigation to reduce the impact of the
residual warming.
1. Solomon S, et al. (2007) Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contri-
bution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment (Cambridge Univ Press,
Cambridge, UK).
2. Nakicenovic N, Swart R (2000) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (Cambridge
Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
3. Cubash U, Meehl GA (2001) inClimate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, eds Houghton
JT, et al. (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
4. Joos F, et al. (2001) Global warming feedbacks on terrestrial carbon uptake under the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emission scenarios.Global Biogeo-
chem Cycles 15:891–907.
5. Wigley TML, Raper SCB (2001) Interpretation of high projections for global-mean
warming. Science 293:451–454.
6. Knutti R, Stocker TF, Joos F, Plattner GK (2002) Constraints on radiative forcing and
future climate change from observations and climate model ensembles. Nature
416:719–723.
7. Friedlingstein P, et al. (2006) Climate-carbon cycle feedback analysis, results from the
C4MIP model intercomparison. J Clim 19:3337–3353.
8. Meehl GA, Covey C, McAvaney B, Latif M, Stouffer RJ (2005) Overview of the coupled
model intercomparison project. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 86:89–93.
9. Webster MD, et al. (2002) Uncertainty in emissions projections for climate models.
Atmos Environ 36:3659–3670.
10. Wigley TML (2005) The climate change commitment. Science 307:1766–1769.
11. Meehl GA, et al. (2005) How much more global warming and sea level rise? Science
307:1769–1772.
12. Hare B, Meinshausen M (2006) How much warming are we committed to and how
much can be avoided? Clim Change 75:111–149.
13. Meinshausen M, et al. (2006) Multi-gas emission pathways to meet climate targets.
Clim Change 75:151–194.
14. O’Neill BC, Oppenheimer M (2004) Climate change impacts are sensitive to the con-
centration stabilization path. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 101:16411–16416.
15. Manne AS, Richels RG (2001) An alternative approach to establishing trade-offs among
greenhouse gasses. Nature 5:675–677.
16. Webster MD, et al. (2003) Uncertainty analysis of climate change and policy response.
Clim Change 61:295–320.
17. Fisher B, et al. (2007) in Climate Change 2007—Mitigation, eds Metz B, Davidson O,
Bosch P, Dave R, Meyer L (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
18. Keppo I, O’Neill BC, Riahia K (2007) Probabilistic temperature change projections and
energy system implications of greenhouse gas emission scenarios. Technol Forecast Soc
Change 74:936–961.
19. Mastandrea MD, Schneider SH (2004) Probabilistic integrated assessment of dangerous
climate change. Science 304:571–574.
20. Wigley TML, et al. (2008) Uncertainties in climate stabilization. Clim Change, in press.
21. Den Elzen MGJ, Van Vuuren DP (2007) Peaking profiles for achieving long-term
temperature targets with more likelihood at lower costs. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
104:17931–17936.
22. Reilly J, Sarofim M, Paltsev S, Prinn R (2006) The role of non-CO2 greenhouse gases in
climate policy: Analysis using the MIT IGSM. Energy Journal Special Issue 3:503–520.
23. van Vuuren DP, Eickhout B, Lucas P, den Elzen MGJ (2006) Long-term multi-gas
scenarios to stabilise radiative forcing—Exploring costs and benefits within an inte-
grated assessment framework. Energy Journal Special Issue 3:201–234.
24. Clarke LE, et al. (2007) Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmospheric
Concentrations. Sub-report 2.1a of Synthesis and Assessment Product 2.1. (Climate
Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research, Wash-
ington DC).
25. Jiang K, Hu X, Songli Z (2006) MultiGas mitigation analysis by IPAC Energy Journal
Special Issue 3:425–440.
26. Rao S, Riahi K (2006) The role of non-CO2 greenhouse gases in climate change
mitigation: Long-term scenarios for the 21st Century. Energy Journal Special Issue
3:177–200.
27. Fujino J, Nair R, Kainuma M, Masui T, Matsuoka Y (2006) Multigas mitigation analysis on
stabilization scenarios using Aim Global model Energy Journal Special Issue 3:343–354.
28. Smith SJ, Wigley TML (2006) MultiGas forcing stabilization with minicam Energy
Journal Special Issue 3:373–392.
29. van Vuuren DP, et al. (2007) Stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at low levels:
An assessment of reduction strategies and costs. Clim Change 81:119–159.
30. Riahi K, Gruebler A, Nakicenovic N (2007) Scenarios of long-term socio-economic and
environmental development under climate stabilization. Forecast Soc Change 74:887–
935.
31. van Vuuren DP, Weyant J, de la Chesnaye F (2006) Multigas scenarios to stabilise
radiative forcing. Energy Econ 28:102–120.
32. Weyant JP, de la Chesnaye FC, Blanford GJ (2007) Overview of EMF21: Multigas
mitigation and climate policy. Energy Journal Special Issue 3:1–32.
33. Plattner G-K, Joos F, Stocker TF, Marchal O (2001) Feedback mechanisms and sensitiv-
ities of ocean carbon uptake under global warming. Tellus 53B:564–592.
34. Plattner G-K, et al.(2008) Long-term climate commitments projected with climate—
Carbon cycle models. J Clim 21:2721–2751.
35. Ramaswamy V, et al. (2001) inClimate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, eds Houghton
JT, et al. (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
36. Azar C, Lindgren K, Larson E, Mo¨llersten K (2006) Carbon capture and storage from
fossil fuels and biomass—Costs and potential role in stabilizing the atmosphere. Clim
Change 74:47–79.
37. Wigley TML (1991) Could reducing fossil-fuel emissions cause global warming. Nature
349:503–506.
38. Weyant JP (2000) An Introduction to the Economics of Climate Change Policy (Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, Washington DC).
39. Knutti R, Joos F, Mueller SA, Plattner GK, Stocker TF (2005) Probabilistic climate change
projections for stabilization profiles. Geophys Res Lett 32:L20707.
40. Meinshausen M (2006) in Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, eds Schellnhuber HJ,
Cramer W, Nakicenovic N, Wigley T, Yohe G (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
15262  www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.0711129105 Van Vuuren et al.
